Pulse
18 May 2026
The era in which we inhabit, which is frequently labelled as postmodern, has generated many ideas that must be subjected to close examination and evaluation. One of the most important of these – if not the most important – is its epistemology, the study of how we know things, which is decidedly constructivist.
Postmodernism eschews the claim that there is objective truth somewhere ‘out there’ which the human mind can grasp. It therefore claims that all knowledge is a social construct, that is, knowledge is not something which is passively received by the human mind, but fashioned by individuals and groups.
It is startling that such a claim (which postmodern philosophers obviously believe to be objectively true!) has gained so much currency in our time, and has made its way into so many scholarly disciplines.
For example, constructivist epistemology plays a very important role in studies on colonialism. In his famous work Orientalism (1978), Edward Said argues that knowledge about the ‘Orient’ was constructed by Western scholars to legitimise Western imperialism.
Constructivist epistemology also dominates gender studies. Influential writers such as Judith Butler have argued against an essentialist understanding of gender. ‘Gender is not something one is,’ Butler asserts in her work Gender Troubles (1990). ‘[I]t is something one does; a series of acts which are renewed, revised, and consolidated through time.’ In other words, gender is a social construct.
Even scientific knowledge is socially constructed, according to some philosophers. For example, in The Science Question in Feminism (1986), Sandra Harding asserts that ‘[a]ll knowledge attempts are socially situated, and the social situation of the knower is integral to the knowledge produced.’ This includes scientific knowledge.
Despite its pervasiveness in modern discourse – both in academia and the broader culture – constructivism has been subjected to harsh criticisms by philosophers and theologians alike. The theological rejection of this theory of knowledge is based on an understanding of reality which is informed by the doctrines of creation and revelation.
In this article, however, I propose to examine some objections to constructivism that have been raised, not by theologians, but by secular philosophers. This discussion shows that while constructivism has gained much traction in postmodern society, it has not succeeded in convincing every secular thinker.
One of the most important arguments levelled against constructivism has to do with its denial of objective truth, which, in the mind of many philosophers would plunge all of us irredeemably into the sea of relativism.
As Susan Haack, a philosopher of science, has rightly pointed out, ‘If constructivism were right, then the distinction between true and false beliefs would collapse into the distinction between what is currently believed by some community and what is not.’
The end result of such an epistemology for human society would surely be disastrous. If every statement made by an individual or a group is nothing more than the subjective expression of the preferences or the imagined reality of that individual or group, the outcome would surely be intellectual paralysis and the end of all constructive dialogue.
If there is no objective truth, then everything is ‘true’. In The Illusions of Postmodernism (1996), Terry Eagleton puts it like this: ‘When cultural theory professes to dismiss truth as a chimera, it ends up justifying a whole range of reactionary ideologies in its name.’
Such an epistemology would make society vulnerable to untold dangers because it categorically invalidates the basis for the judgement or assessment of any claim. And in the absence of a reality that is universally accessible, all that remains is power.
Postmodern constructivist epistemology therefore leads to an endless contestation of power. Society simply cannot be ordered on the basis of such an epistemology without imploding.
Constructivism would also spell the end of scientific inquiry and science itself. More alarmingly, because objective inquiry is ruled out by constructivism, any theory presented by a group of scientists would be passed off as science – as long as the scientific community endorses it as such.
A constructivist epistemology therefore privileges ideological affinity over intellectual rigour and integrity. This is spectacularly brought out by the so-called ‘Sokal Hoax.’
In 1996, Alan Sokal, a professor of physics at New York University submitted an article entitled ‘Transgressing Boundaries: Toward a Transformative Hermeneutics of Quantum Gravity’ to the prestigious journal Social Text. Sokal purposely wrote in such a way that the article sounded sophisticated, but contained falsehoods and meaningless sentences.
To his surprise, the journal published the article in its Spring/Summer 1996 issue. Sokal then wrote another article for the journal Lingua Franca revealing that the article he had submitted to Social Text was a hoax.
In his Lingua Franca article Sokal explains:
I wrote the article to explore the question: Would a leading North American journal of cultural studies – whose editorial collective includes such luminaries as Fredric Jameson and Andrew Ross – publish an article liberally salted with nonsense if (a) it sounded good and (b) it flattered the editors’ ideological preconceptions?
The Sokal Hoax – as it was later called – shows how academia, influenced as it is by postmodern constructivism, no longer requires intellectual rigour and objectivity in academic discourse and publication, at least from works which align with the preferred narrative.
Commenting on the incident, the atheist philosopher Daniel Dennett noted that ‘[t]he hoax revealed the extent to which fashionable academic circles were willing to accept balderdash if it seemed to support their political or philosophical agenda.’
Finally, postmodern constructivist epistemology is in the final analysis self-refuting. If knowledge is, without exception, the product of social construction, then the postmodern constructivist theory of knowledge must also be socially constructed.
This means that the postmodern theory is unable to claim a privileged position over other epistemological theories, such as critical realism. Yet, postmodern philosophers appear to be constantly making just such a claim.
Daniel Dennett’s assessment and critique is therefore exactly correct: ‘Constructivist critiques often seem to reply on a kind of philosophical exceptionalism, where they exempt themselves from the very scrutiny they apply to others.’
This consequential inconsistency gravely undermines the credibility of postmodern constructivist epistemology.
As the conservative philosopher Roger Scruton has so arrestingly put it in his excellent book, Fools, Frauds and Firebrands: Thinkers of the New Left (2015), ‘Postmodern theory is therefore condemned to the condition of the snake that swallows itself.’
Dr Roland Chia is Chew Hock Hin Professor at Trinity Theological College (Singapore) and Theological and Research Advisor of the Ethos Institute for Public Christianity.